Abstract: This work proposes mean field game-type models for two instances of largescale energy systems, namely plug-in electric vehicles and thermostatically controlled loads. Theoretical and numerical analysis show that both systems possess an equilibrium configuration which is optimal for the individuals and beneficial for the overall population.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest and a change of perspective in the study of energy systems, as a consequence of several reasons. Among these, the introduction of a large number of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) is foreseen to significantly impact the power grid in the nearby future. Their aggregate energy demand poses new challenges that can be addressed in several ways, as for instance by macroscopic incentives that allow coordination of the charging schedules. Another emerging opportunity arises from the recent deployment of millions of smart meters, sensors, and control devices in electric power distribution grids down to residential and commercial buildings; the availability of this technology enables the supply and demand sides to interact by exchanging price and demand information. In fact when provided with sufficient incentives, thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) may be willing to adjust their energy usage to tradeoff between comfort and energy consumption. We model these two large-scale systems via mean field games techniques, focusing on the interaction between the aggregate behavior of the population and the individual agent, which trades-off its own good with the interest of the overall system [1] . The analysis of such models seeks to find equilibrium configurations by exploiting the large number of agents involved in the game.
MODELING OF ENERGY SYSTEMS

Plug-in Electric Vehicles
We first investigate the problem of coordinating the charging schedule of a large population of PEVs, introduced in [2] and extended in [3] . For each PEV i ∈ Z[1, N ], we consider the discrete-time linear dynamics x 
The interest of each vehicle is to minimize its charging cost
where
is the electricity price function at different time instants. We consider a dynamic pricing, where the price of electricity at time t depends on the overall demand at time t; the overall demand is the sum of the inflexible demand and the aggregate PEV demand. The price is here modeled to be the affine function p(z) := 2 (az + c), where z and c ≥ 0 are the PEV and non-PEV demands, while the parameter a > 0 represents the inverse of the price elasticity. Since such linear cost leads to optimal solutions which are discontinuous with respect to the aggregate demand z, following [2] , [3] we introduce a quadratic relaxation term.
Given the average PEV demand z = (z 0 , . . . , z T −1 ), the optimal charging control
where δ > 0 should be chosen small to approximate the original linear cost 2(az + c) u i [3, Section V].
Thermostatically Controlled Loads
As a second example of large-scale energy system we describe here a population of TCLs. By considering the discrete-time counterpart of [4] , in [5] we model the switching dynamics of each TCL i ∈ Z[1, N ] as
where x i t ∈ R is the temperature deviation from the setpoint 0 at time t,ū 
where z t := [z . The term 2 (C t z t + c t ) ( xt+1 ut ) couples every single TCL to the overall population through the vector z and represents an incentive for the TCL to participate in grid services. Specifically, each TCL has an incentive to turn OFF during a power demand peak and to turn ON during a power demand valley (analogously for the temperature).
The optimal response of TCL i with respect to a reference signal from the utility is given by the mapping
T denotes convex state constraints, for instance in terms of comfort boundaries
T is the set of convexified control inputs, and
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
The model (1) of a population of PEVs and the model (4) of a population of TCLs both result in a convex optimization problem, with a quadratic cost function whose linear part depends on the average behavior z. The two models aim to describe large-scale populations, hence their analysis cannot be performed via standard game theoretical techniques. However, using operator theory concepts it is shown in [6] that the two systems possess an ε-Nash equilibrium configuration, with ε going linearly to zero as the population size N grows. Moreover, [6] proposes an iterative algorithm that steers the population towards such equilibrium configuration. In Figure 1 and 2 we report the average population behaviors at the equilibrium configurations found via the algorithmic procedure. Both figures reveal that the coupling between the individual's interest and the population's average behavior is beneficial for the overall system. In fact Figure 1 shows that the coordination of the charging schedule of the PEVs results in filling the overnight gap of the non-PEV demand; such aggregate behavior ensures that large excursions in demand are not likely to happen. Similarly, Figure 2 indicates that the TCLs on average may fail to follow their ON/OFF reference signals to avoid aggregate demand peaks or valleys, thus improving system stability (for instance, in terms of frequency synchronization [4] ).
Using the same numerical values as in [6] , Figure 2 shows that, if we choose the p > 0 small enough, we recover the valley-filling solution, known to be globally optim case without charging upper bounds [6, 
